29 ideas
| 4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
| 10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
| 10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
| 10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
| 10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
| 10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
| 10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
| 10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
| 10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
| 10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
| 15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
| 8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
| 8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
| 8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
| 8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
| 8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
| 8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
| 8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
| 8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
| 8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
| 10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
| 15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
| 4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
| 8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
| 8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |