21 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |