10 ideas
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |