9 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |