7 ideas
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |