Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Beyond Good and Evil' and 'First-Order Modal Logic'

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81 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / a. Symbols of ML
Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / c. Derivation rules of ML
Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
□P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / e. System K4
The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
□ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche]
A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche]
A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche]