11 ideas
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
| 14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
| 14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |