20 ideas
| 1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
| 20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
| 5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
| 5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
| 1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
| 1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
| 1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
| 1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |