14 ideas
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |