Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]