Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' and 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]