19 ideas
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |