12 ideas
| 19048 | Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine] |
| 19047 | Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine] |
| 14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
| 14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 19049 | In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine] |
| 19046 | Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine] |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| 14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
| 14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 19050 | Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine] |
| 14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |