13 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 2713 | Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
| 8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
| 8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |