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All the ideas for 'Content Preservation', 'Intro to Gdel's Theorems' and 'The Will to Power (notebooks)'

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127 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P]
Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P]
A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P]
A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P]
An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P]
A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P]
A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P]
Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P]
A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P]
'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P]
A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P]
A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P]
Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P]
A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P]
A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P]
The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P]
The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P]
All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / b. Baby arithmetic
Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P]
Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / c. Robinson arithmetic
Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P]
Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P]
Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche]
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche]
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche]
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche]
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche]
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche]
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche]
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche]
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche]
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche]
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche]
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche]