14 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
| 8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
| 16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
| 8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| 3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
| 3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |