77 ideas
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |