Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford', 'Causation' and 'There is no question of physicalism'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
7855 Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
8386 Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
6120 Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
18088 Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
6121 There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8387 A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8384 The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved [Crane]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
18089 Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]