Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' and 'Chapters on Scepticism'

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
18755 Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18751 Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
18761 Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18753 An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18754 Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
18757 Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
18760 The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14664 Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
14666 Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
14662 Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16472 Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
1799 If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
16470 Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
14663 Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
18762 A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee]