13 ideas
| 11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
| 15382 | Paraconsistent reasoning can just mean responding sensibly to inconsistencies [Jago] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |