33 ideas
22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |