Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Phil Applications of Cognitive Science' and 'An Introduction to Modal Logic'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
9540 A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
9541 The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
9543 The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
9544 A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
4045 Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
4044 Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
4048 Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
4043 Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
4049 The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
4047 Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]