Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'The Condemnation of 1277' and 'The Nature of Thought'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)]