Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols)' and 'Being and Nothingness'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
7807 The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9618 Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
9830 Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
22227 For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17265 Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
20743 Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9185 Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
6151 Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6164 Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
22276 Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
17264 Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
12232 A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
12233 The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
7074 Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
6687 Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
22228 Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
22233 Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
20755 Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
20760 Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
22231 We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]