37 ideas
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 23928 | Good art produces exaltation and detachment [Bell,C] |
| 23922 | The word 'beauty' leads to confusion, because it denotes distinct emotions [Bell,C] |
| 23929 | We only see landscapes as artistic if we ignore their instrumental value [Bell,C] |
| 23921 | Our feeling for natural beauty is different from the aesthetic emotion of art [Bell,C] |
| 23923 | Visual form can create a sublime mental state [Bell,C] |
| 23927 | Aestheticism invites artist to create beauty, but with no indication of how to do it [Bell,C] |
| 23932 | Art is the expression of an emotion for ultimate reality [Bell,C] |
| 8115 | Only artists can discern significant form; other people must look to art to find it [Bell,C, by Gardner] |
| 23924 | Maybe significant form gives us a feeling for ultimate reality [Bell,C] |
| 23931 | Significant form is the essence of art, which I believe expresses an emotion about reality [Bell,C] |
| 20434 | 'Form' is visual relations, and it is 'significant' if it moves us aesthetically; art needs both [Bell,C, by Feagin] |
| 23934 | The only expression art could have is the emotion resulting from pure form [Bell,C] |
| 23925 | Mere copies of pictures are not significant - unless the copies are very exact [Bell,C] |
| 23926 | Art is distinguished by its aesthetic emotion, which produces appropriate form [Bell,C] |
| 23935 | Aesthetic experience is an exaltation which increases the possibilities of life [Bell,C] |
| 23933 | Aesthetic contemplation is the best and most intense mental state [Bell,C] |
| 22691 | Only artistic qualities matter in art, because they also have the highest moral value [Bell,C] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 23930 | Religion sees infinite value in some things, and irrelevance in the rest [Bell,C] |