38 ideas
14018 | Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
14008 | The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
14009 | It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne] |
14010 | All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne] |
6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
14016 | The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne] |
14019 | Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne] |
14013 | Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne] |
14015 | No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne] |
14007 | How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne] |
14011 | Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne] |
14017 | Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne] |
14003 | Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne] |
14005 | B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne] |
14006 | Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne] |
6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |