19 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |