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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'works' and 'What is Philosophy?'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
8220 Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
8217 Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
8242 Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
8223 The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
8247 Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
8224 'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
8219 Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
8246 Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
8221 We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
8222 Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
8218 Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3161 If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3177 You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
8248 Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
8245 The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
8243 Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]