18 ideas
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
| 3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
| 5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
| 3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
| 20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
| 5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
| 5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
| 5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |