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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Pragmatism and Objective Truth' and 'Syntagma'

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18 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]