18 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |