21 ideas
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |