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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)' and 'Senses of Essence'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11178 The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11175 Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11176 The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
11174 A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11177 Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11173 Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6498 Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
5493 If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
4600 Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]