Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)' and 'Apology for Raymond Sebond'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
6259 Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
6263 No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
6258 Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
6262 We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6498 Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6260 Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
6261 The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
5493 If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
4600 Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]