16 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
21733 | The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA] |
21739 | Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA] |
21736 | It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA] |
21734 | It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA] |
21735 | Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA] |