Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'What is Knowledge-First Epistemology?' and 'Many, but almost one'

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17 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
15538 Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
15537 If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
15536 We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19539 If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
15539 Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]