25 ideas
| 21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
| 19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
| 13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
| 21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
| 8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
| 8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
| 8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |