17 ideas
5831 | The new view is that "water" is a name, and has no definition [Schwartz,SP] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
5826 | The intension of "lemon" is the conjunction of properties associated with it [Schwartz,SP] |