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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Negation' and 'Letters to Coste'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
18781 Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
19433 The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18789 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
18790 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
18787 Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
18793 Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
18784 In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
18780 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
18786 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18782 The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
18783 Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18792 Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
18785 Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
18788 For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
19434 There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18791 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]