19 ideas
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
15897 | Zermelo realised that Choice would facilitate the sort of 'counting' Cantor needed [Zermelo, by Lavine] |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |