Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'The New Organon' and 'Philosophical Naturalism'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
3509 Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
16639 Only individual bodies exist [Bacon]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
16033 There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
21950 Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
3513 How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
3514 Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
3510 Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
3511 Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3515 Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3512 If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3516 The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]