19 ideas
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
16639 | Only individual bodies exist [Bacon] |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
16033 | There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon] |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
21950 | Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon] |