17 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
3364 | All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano] |
3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |