Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Psychology from an empirical standpoint' and 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits'

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17 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]