Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Unpublished Writings 1872-74' and 'This is Political Philosophy'

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche]
You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche]
Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche]
Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche]
The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf]
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf]
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf]
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf]
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf]
Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf]
If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche]