18 ideas
17992 | The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
8361 | What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv] |
8363 | p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv] |
8364 | We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv] |
8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
8360 | We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv] |
8365 | Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv] |