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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)' and 'Pragmatism in Retrospect'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
14796 Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
15335 Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
14795 Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12755 Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12760 Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
12759 There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
12718 Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12758 It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
19408 To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]