43 ideas
7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |