Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'The Metaphysics of Modality' and 'The Book of Chuang Tzu'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


50 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Words of wisdom are precise and clear [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Don't even start, let's just stay put [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Disagreement means you do not understand at all [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
If you beat me in argument, does that mean you are right? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Do not try to do things, or to master knowledge; just be empty [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
You know you were dreaming when you wake, but there might then be a greater awakening from that [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
Did Chuang Tzu dream he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dream he was Chuang Tzu? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The perfect man has no self [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
To see with true clarity, your self must be irrelevant [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
If words can't be defined, they may just be the chirruping of chicks [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Great courage is not violent [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
As all life is one, what need is there for words? [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Go with the flow, and be one with the void of Heaven [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
Fish forget about each other in the pond and forget each other in the Tao [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]