27 ideas
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
| 16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
| 16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
| 16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
| 16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
| 16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
| 16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
| 4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
| 16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
| 16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
| 2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
| 2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
| 16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |