16 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
21598 | Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson] |