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All the ideas for 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)', 'Nietzsche's System' and 'fragments/reports'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
20349 Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson]
20351 Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson]
20350 Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
5998 From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
20832 The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14304 Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6024 Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
20356 Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
20366 A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson]