24 ideas
15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
18988 | Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing [Wright,Ch] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |